Our contemporary social and media lives are in permanent change. Media, in different countries around the world, is confronted with questions and the confusion that arises as adequate responses to the rapidly changing economic and social conditions, such as economic crises and devaluations, financial and job cuts, technological diffusion, and all other types of challenges are followed by severe social consequences, disappointments, and uncertainties (Hjarvard, 2003; Deuze, 2008; Hallin, 2009; Deuze, 2012) .
with limited knowledge and very few guidelines that could be applied to comprehending contemporary complexities. Our contemporary realities are charged with appearances that do not conform to standard models of comprehension of how media and journalism should function, especially those built on Western traditions and modern experience. In the broadest sense, what we observe, identify and deal with in the Baltic societies today is something -political and media cultures -which has actually emerged and was formed after the soviet epoch.
Moreover, many questions we are posing today and many challenges we are confronted with at this time could not have been dreamed or envisioned in our countries in the late 1980s. Two decades ago, none of the Baltic countries had any doubt that after only a few years of living in independence their economies and qualities of life would be comparable to those, for example, of Nordic countries or other Western European democracies. All popular social and cultural imaginings of that time in the Baltic countries were constructed around the idea of those countries' 'return to the West' . And this 'return' was imagined as authentic, quick, and unproblematic.
What becomes clear now, however, is that the comprehension of the unknown future, the understanding of new situations, requires having new ideas, models, metaphors, and keywords, and no less original, theoretical and practical approaches. In other words, to comprehend particularities of media life in today's Baltics, one needs to construct an adequate explanatory model in order to understand all diversities and commonalities of life in changing and transforming societies. * Indeed, political and social transformations of the 1990s in Central and Eastern Europe have brought changes of incomprehensible scale and speed. In the former soviet bloc countries, and in all spheres of social life, this transformation turned out to be a project of 'returning to diversity' .
Among those many new, emerging, and young democracies, the three Baltic nations were the only countries with none of their own, 'national' institutions, structures or other resources on which they could rely during the period of rapid change. Those countries had to step onto the track of rapid 'nationalization' of existing social structures and institutions, to introduce monetary, economic, market and privatization reforms, and to start other broad-scale social reorganizations. Almost simultaneously, those countries also had to face new challenges of a much broader scale and uncertainty such as the globalization and internationalization of markets and ideas, Westernization and Europeanization, risk and crisis management, technological development and diffusion, internetization and individualization and consumerism.
Having comparable and very similar start-up positions in almost all spheres of social and political life in the late 1980s and the beginning of 1990s, two decades later, political and economic developments in each of the three Baltic countries demonstrate both similarities and substantial divergences. Although rightly described as (consolidating) liberal market economies, each of the three Baltic nations has chosen its own route of transition and transformation, and today, each demonstrates its own qualities and characteristics along their paths of development, democratization and liberalization.
Despite certain divergences, a number of commonalities must be identified as representative features of Baltic societies and their media and journalism cultures. The next sections of this paper identify the most emblematic of these. * Among the most dramatic developments in the mainstream media in the Baltic countries is their striking loss of public trust. Public trust in mass media has dropped to its lowest level in a decade, with only about one third of their populations expressing trust in the media. Undeniably, this has significant effects on the commercialization and popularization of content, and also on the behavior of different audience groups. Many of those groups, especially younger audiences, have swapped mainstream media channels for different specialized and niche media products, such as magazines or online portals that target consumers with individualized interests. Alternatively, they remain loyal to certain mainstream media outlets ('hits') while supplementing their news diet with a broader spectrum of niche channels, both online and offline.
Indeed, similar tendencies of low trust in public institutions, high numbers of people dissatisfied with how political institutions in a country function, and low levels of associational involvement, engagement and partnership (see Table 1 ) are noticed in most of Central and Eastern Europe. Although all this statistical data is self-explanatory, it does not directly mean that, for example, those potential voters who would vote against democracy in contemporary CEE would support and follow essentially un-democratic ('a strong hand') approaches. On the contrary, public distrust in politics may rely on distrust of those who are actually elected into political institutions, and the content of policies applied by them. Additionally, the data shows the dissatisfaction of people with how institutional 'cultures' are functioning within the country in question. The quality of democracy strongly relies on the quality of media. By reflecting how politics is functioning, the media is opening a space for public debate. From a normative perspective, the media have three specific democratic functions to meet: it must safeguard the flow of information, it should provide a forum for public discussion and debate, and it should observe those holding power positions in a society. Having a normative view is indeed crucial -in media assessments it allows a handle on progress.
As noticed, in most cases the Baltic media's response to democratic needs and requirements is fairly mixed -the media seldom functions as a pure and actual contributor to the needs of democracy and the public good. Likewise, the general public disappointment is also due to the interrelated processes of growing commercialization and marketization of media and politics -the rise of strategic political communications, and the rise of partisan and ideologicallytinted journalism. In the same way, the public trust and quality of democracy decreases when media moves into the field of political and economic powersharing and instrumentalization, and when self-censorship becomes an everyday reality among professionals.
All things considered, the Baltic media life is multi-faceted. Although certain practices may be assessed as culturally representative and dominating, the above noted media performance is counterbalanced with additional developments. In all three countries, niche and specialized magazines, internet, social media, and blogs seem to migrate and mature into a replica space favorable to the development of dialogical and interactive communication between different groups, and offering responsible journalism with a controlling function. * Generally, the Baltic media scene seems to be heterogeneous and polarized, with each media sector operating under its own logic: the mainstream media seeks institutional and popular establishment and functions under the logic of commercialism, whereas alternative and niche media aims at fulfilling the needs and expectations of underrepresented (niche) audience groups.
In the broadest sense, as a concept and metaphor, social heterogeneity and polarization seems to be the most appropriate description of contemporary societies that could be best described through the distinctive culture and existing traditions most clearly identified in the mixed, hybrid characters of norms and values, as well as the mixed political cultures that underlie the formations of different social structures, public spheres and the discourses maintained there.
These mixed values are also observed and maintained in social and professional networks (such as media networks), each functioning with their own logic, customs, disposition, character, and ethos.
As noticed, access and active public consumption of (alternative) news media leads to the rise and establishment of completely new networks, to the rise of social movements and public formations with their own sets of ideals, values, ideologies, and, most importantly, authorities and leading intellectual figures. These networks eventually become completely new social and cultural associations built, first of all, on foundations of trust.
Such alternative media spheres also have their own unique characteristics. They have revived the commentary genre, and new topics enriching public discourse are continuously emerging there. Even more, these spheres are used for reframing of mainstream media frames. Such an environment literally becomes a parallel media sphere existing side by side with mainstream media, containing within itself manifestations of conventional media such as cultural weeklies or monthly political and economic magazines, as well as certain television and radio programs.
In spite of all doubts and uncertainties on how these parallel media developments will evolve and what forms of social involvement and public engagement they will take, these developments also show that an unparalleled degree of human agency and user control is registered in the Baltic countries. This is observed, for example, in the rise of new media and diversification and pluralization of the blogosphere, changes in media routines and conventional media use among young audiences, as well as other developments. How this new type of agency will evolve and how its public power will be used remains to be seen. But a few things remain clear. All these developments also underline that impartial, objective and truth-seeking professional journalism is still vital in these 'liquid' and uncertain times. Only these professional qualities have to be rethought and re-established in the era of economic and financial uncertainties and digital communications.
